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STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

Case No. 20100668-CA

LONNY HIGH
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
Before begii n lii ig, a : leai distil i.c tioi 1 1 i n isl be n lade

Oi 1 appeal, I ligl i challenges

the admissibility of specific questions asked on cross-examination over his objection.
See Br. of Appellant, 10-12; R 234:306-309. These questions dealt with the violent
activities <•' !'

:i id

I ligl \ 's pei soi ial ii ivolvei i iei it ii 11! lose acti\ ities I < t

n i g h uucb not challenge other evidence of his membership in or affiliation with
PVL. For example, he does not challenge his testimony at trial that he was a member of
PV I , I le does not challenge evidence tl ial he 1 lad "I "' \ I ." tattooed on his 1 lai id I le does
i lot cl lallenge evidence tl ial son leoi le ;> elled "I * V I ." at tl; le ei id of the confrontation at issue
in this case.
High makes this clarification at the outset because several of the State's arguments
Ii imp all of tl le gai ig evide T ice ii i togetl iei w hicl i leads t : a general coi lii isioi i of tl le
issues.

High will attempt to clarify this confusion in this brief by referring to the
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evidence he challenges as the "challenged evidence," and by pointing out the State's
arguments which fail to make the proper distinction between challenged and
unchallenged evidence.
With that clarification, High now turns to the State's brief, and addresses new
arguments raised therein.
I.

RULE 404 APPLIES TO THE CHALLENGED EVIDENCE.
<

The first major argument raised in the State's brief is that the challenged evidence
was not evidence of other bad acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b). The State presents
three variations of this argument:

{

1) the challenged evidence does not speak to High's character or other bad acts;
2) the challenged evidence was relevant and was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose; and
3) the challenged evidence was intrinsic to the crime charged.
Br. of Appellee, 13-22.

i

High will address each of these arguments in turn and will show that Rule 404(b)
is the applicable rule of evidence.
a.

The challenged evidence speaks to High's other bad acts.
The State first argues that the challenged evidence was not evidence of other bad
4

acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b) because the challenged evidence did not speak to
High's character or other bad acts. Br. of Appellee, 13-22. However, a brief review of
some of the challenged evidence, in context, shows otherwise. The following is an
excerpt of High's cross-examination by the prosecutor:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

Q. Okay, does [PVL] do anything to be able to protect or to be able to assert itself
within [its] boundary?
A. We have conflicts with rival gangs.
Q. "Conflicts," meaning?
A. Fights.
Q. Fights?
A. Yeah.
Q. Willingly coming together to meet a rival gang to fight?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you understand that that's probably illegal?
A. Yeah.
Q. But the organization doesn't have a problem with that?
A. No.
Q. So you participated in that kind of similar activity before?
A. Yeah.
Q. So the organization exists to fight rival gangs?
A. Yeah.

Q. Is there any status at all within PVL? Is there any way that you gain status and
reputation? Like, for instance, in my business as an attorney, you know, I gain
reputation by being a good attorney, and achieving results. Is there anything like
that in PVL? Is there anything that would give you nay [sic] kind of status within
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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PVL?
A. Just the like all the fighting and stuff.
Q. Okay.
A. Just the stuff you do.
Q. So the more that you do or the braver you are or the more aggressive you are,
that gives you status?
A. Yeah.
Q. You've been in there for like four years?
A. Yeah.

1

(R. 234:306-309.)
During this exchange, the prosecutor directly established High's other bad acts. In
context, the jury could not have construed the prosecutor's question "So you participated
in that kind of similar activity before?" to mean anything other than that High
participated in violent altercations with rival gangs in the past. Contrary to the State's

{

assertion, it was not a general question intended to encompass graffiti or other activities.
See Br. of Appellee, 15 n. 3, 18. It directly established High's personal involvement in
previous violence.
Furthermore, the prosecutor established High's character and other bad acts by
implication. In the context of questions establishing that members of PVL gain status
through aggressive behavior, the prosecutor asked "You've been in [PVL] for like four
years?" While these questions standing alone established only the duration of High's
involvement in PVL and the violent propensities of PVL members, the jury could not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

have misunderstood the implication that High himself had been violent on prior occasions
as a member of PVL.
Lastly, the prosecutor established that High had participated in multiple prior
fights. The prosecutor established that PVL existed for the purpose of engaging in plural
"fights"; that High had "participated in that kind of...activity before"; and that High had
been a member of PVL for four years. In context, the jury could not have concluded that
High had participated in only one prior fight, as suggested by the State in its brief. See
Br. of Appellee, 15 n. 3, 18.
In sum, the challenged evidence spoke to High's other bad acts. It was not limited
to evidence of High's affiliation with PVL, as suggested by the State. See Br. of
Appellee, 14-16. The State's argument to the contrary is an invitation to this Court to
ignore the context and implications of the prosecutor's questions. This Court should
decline the invitation and apply Rule 404(b).
b.

The State presents a paradox by applying Rule 404 to support an argument
that Rule 404 does not apply.
Next, the State argues Rule 404(b) should not apply because the challenged

evidence was not offered to show High's violent propensities or character, but was
instead offered for several other, non-character purposes.

Br. of Appellee, 16-17.

Specifically, the State asserts that the challenged evidence established "very specific
relationships" between High and co-defendant Cristobal, and also provided possible
motives for the alleged assault on Desi and Emilio Maciel. Br. of Appellee, 16-17.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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These relationships and motives, the State argues, were relevant to whether Defendant
acted in concert with two or more persons. Br. of Appellee, 16.
This argument fails because it presents a paradox. Rule 404(b) excludes other bad
acts that are offered to show propensity, and admits other bad acts that are relevant and
offered for proper, non-character purposes. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. NelsonWaggoner, 2000 UT 59, THf 18 - 20 >

6 p 3d

-

112°-

Th

^ State argues that Rule 404(b) should

not apply to the challenged evidence because the challenged evidence meets Rule
404(b)?s requirements: it was not offered to show propensity, but was instead offered for
proper, non-character purposes.

Thus, the State applies Rule 404(b) to support its

\

assertion that Rule 404(b) should not apply. Such an argument defies logic.
As part of this argument, the State confuses this case with a Nevada case, Somee v.
State, 187 P.3d 152 (Nev. 2008), which held that a defendant's admitted membership in a
gang was not character evidence. Somee is not applicable to this case.
Two important facts distinguish this case from Somee.

The first is that

{

membership in a criminal gang was an element of the crimes charged in Somee. 187 P.3d
at 154 (an element of the crimes charged was "the intent to promote, further, or assist a
criminal gang").
Second, the prosecutor in Somee carefully limited the gang evidence to the
i

defendant's admission that he was a member of a gang. Id. at 157. The prosecutor did
not introduce other evidence concerning the gang or the defendant's illegal activities with
the gang. Id.

(
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In the present case, membership in a gang was not an element of the crime charged
as it was in the crime charged in Somee. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2009
amendment). Furthermore, unlike the prosecutor in Somee, the prosecutor in this case did
not limit his questions on cross-examination to Defendant's mere membership in a gang.
As shown above, the prosecutor went well beyond High's membership in PVL and
questioned High regarding the violent character of PVL as an organization and High's
personal involvement in violent PVL behavior.

The District Court's admission of

evidence that went beyond High's gang affiliation is what separates this case from
Somee, and is the very point that High challenges on appeal.
Thus, Somee is not applicable to this case. The admission of the challenged
evidence is governed by Rule 404(b).
c.

High's participation in other violence was not intrinsic to the crime charged.
Lastly, the State argues that Rule 404(b) should not apply because the challenged

evidence was "intrinsic to the charged crime." Br. of Appellee, 20-22. To support this
argument, the State reasons that the challenged evidence is analogous to evidence of a
criminal conspiracy that the Fifth Circuit held to be "intrinsic to the charged crime" in
United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420 (5th Cir. 1995). Br. of Appellee, 20.
The analogy is inapt because in Krout, gang membership and illegal gang
activities were "intrinsic to the charged crime" because they were elements of the charged
crime. The multiple defendants in Krout were charged under the federal RICO statute,
which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
were "employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt:' 18 U.S.C § 1962(c) (last amended 1988)
(emphasis added).
The prosecution alleged in the indictment that the defendants had violated the
RICO statute through their membership in the "Mexican Mafia," a criminal gang that
engaged in drug-trafficking, intimidation, and murder. 66 F.3d at 1424. One of the
defendants, Alvarez, objected to the admission at trial of two of his prior traffic stops1 by
police officers on the ground that they violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Id. at 1431.
The Fifth Circuit held that evidence concerning the prior stops was "intrinsic to the
crime charged/1 and not character evidence, because it connected Alvarez with other
members of the Mexican Mafia and corroborated the testimony of another witness that
members of the Mexican Mafia were involved in a drug trafficking operation. Id. at
1431. Given that Alvarez's membership in the Mexican Mafia and the Mexican Mafia's
illegal drug-trafficking were elements of the crimes charged under the RICO statute, this
holding is unsurprising.
In this case, however, High's membership in PVL and PVL's illegal activities
were not elements of the crimes charged. See R. 3-1. High was not charged with being a
member of PVL, or with participating in PVL's violent activities. The relevant language

1

The Fifth Circuit recited the circumstances of these stops as follows: "During the first
stop, on June 11, 1992, Alvarez fled the scene and discarded nine packets of heroin and a
handgun. The second stop, which occurred on March 12, 1993, was for driving while
intoxicated."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the enhancement statute under which High was convicted provided only that the trier
of fact had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "defendant was aided or encouraged
by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was aware that he was so
aided and encouraged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (2009 amendment).
Thus, this Court should not apply the reasoning of Krout to this case because
High's affiliation with PVL and his violent activities as a member of PVL were not
elements of the crimes charged.

The challenged evidence in this case constitutes

extrinsic evidence of High's other bad acts, and this Court should hold that Rule 404(b) is
the proper standard by which admission of the challenged evidence should be judged.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT INFER A SCRUPULOUS EXAMINATION
FROM THE RECORD.
The second major argument raised in the State's brief is that even if the challenged

evidence was evidence of other bad acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b), the District
Court conducted a scrupulous examination of the challenged evidence.

However,

although the State acknowledges that the District Court "might not have recited extensive
findings on the issue," the State argues that this Court should bail the District Court out
by inferring a scrupulous examination from the record. Br. of Appellee, 23-25.
The State cites State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, 256 P.3d 1102, for the
proposition that this Court can infer a scrupulous examination of 404(b) evidence from
the evidence and argument before the trial court on the issue. Br. of Appellee, 24-25. It
is true that Burke concluded, under its facts, that "based on the evidence and argument
before the trial court...it can be inferred that the trial court 'scrupulously examined' the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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relevant evidence." 2011 UT App 168 at ]f 27. However, Burke is very difficult to apply
to this case, or any case, because it did not explicitly identify the evidence or argument in
the record that led the Court to infer a scrupulous examination.
For that reason, High urges this Court to limit Burke to its facts and not apply it to
this case. Where Burke did not identify the evidence or argument that supported its
conclusion, a broad application of its holding would disembowel the well-established
"scrupulous examination" standard. See e.g. State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77, 250
P.3d 89; State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120.
Furthermore, even if the Court wished to expand the general holding in Burke that
a scrupulous examination can be inferred from the record in some cases, this case does
not meet the purpose.

The State argues that the Court should infer a scrupulous

examination from the following facts on the record:
1) the District Court considered the admissibility of gang evidence before and after
opening statements on the first day of trial, and before and after High testified on
the second day of trial;
2) the District Court observed that High's defense was that he and Cristobal "didn't
initiate anything, because they are not gang members";
3) the District Court stated that "I ruled that once the door is opened.. .there can be
some threshold inquiries as it relates to [PVL] itself;
4) the District Court indicated that the evidence was admissible to explore the
relationship between the codefendants; and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5) the District Court denied the mistrial because "the inquiries on the part of the
State of Utah" did not go "beyond the direction of the court."
Br. of Appellee, 24.
These record references are not sufficient for this Court to infer a scrupulous
examination.

To begin with, some of the above items do not even pertain to the

"scrupulous examination" standard. Items 2 and 3 above relate to the doctrine of open
doors or curative admissibility, not admissibility under Rule 404(b). While it is true that
the doctrine of open doors can apply to Rule 404, it only applies after a defendant
introduces evidence to prove his good character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(1). High did
not do so in this case.
Item 5, for its part, is a bare statement of the District Court's ruling admitting the
challenged evidence, made on the record after High testified. There is nothing to separate
this item from item 1, where the State already pointed out that the District Court
reconsidered the matter after High testified.
Thus, the only facts on the record indicated by the State which are relevant to a
scrupulous examination are items 1 and 4. High urges this Court not to expand Burke
and infer a scrupulous examination in this case merely because the District Court passed
upon the issue of admissibility under Rule 404(b) several times during trial and
ultimately concluded, without explaining why, that the evidence was admissible to
explore the relationship between the co-defendants.
To expand Burke on these facts alone would be contrary to this Court's recent
decision in State v. Ferguson, 2011 UT App 77, 250 P.3d 89. In Ferguson, the defendant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Id. at ]j 3. The charge was
enhanced because of the defendant's prior convictions for sexual crimes against children.
Id. at f 4.
Prior to trial in Ferguson, the defendant filed a motion to bifurcate the guilt and
enhancement phases of the trial, as well as a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his
prior convictions for sex crimes against children and his admissions to other uncharged
sexual encounters with children. Id. at Tf 4. The State responded to the defendant's
motions with a letter indicating that it did not intend to introduce evidence of the
defendant's prior convictions during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at <[ 4.
The defendant's motions were argued on the first day of trial, and the trial court
bifurcated the guilt and enhancement phases of trial. Id. at f 5. However, after brief
argument from both sides, the trial court ruled that a recording of an interview in which
the defendant admitted to sexual encounters with approximately 50 children was
admissible under Rule 404(b) because the defendant admitted in the interview that little
girls "turned him on." Id. atfflf6, 15.
The trial court reconsidered the issue on the second day of trial. Id. at ^f 15. The
trial court ruled at that time that that the interview was also admissible under Rule 404(b)
because it demonstrated the defendant's knowledge and intent. Id. at f 15.
On appeal, this Court held that the trial court failed to conduct a scrupulous
examination.

Despite the fact that the trial court received written motions, heard

argument from both sides, and considered the issue of admissibility under Rule 404(b)
twice during trial, this Court did not infer a scrupulous examination. Rather, this Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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held that the trial court did not meet the scrupulous examination standard because it failed
to conduct only one part of a scrupulous examination:
Even if we assume that the bad acts evidence in this case was admitted for a
proper purpose...and that it is relevant, there is no indication that the trial court
performed the final step of the rule 404(b) analysis. Before admitting other bad
acts evidence, even if relevant and offered for a proper purpose, the trial court was
required to consider whether, applying rule 403 and the factors like those
identified in Shickles, the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of
unfair prejudice to [defendant]...Because the record is devoid of any indication
that the trial court undertook the scrupulous examination standard, we conclude
that it exceeded its discretion."
Id atfflf16-17.
Ferguson is directly on point with this case. In this case, the State argues that the
Court should infer a scrupulous examination because the trial court considered the issue
of admissibility under Rule 404(b) several times and ultimately concluded that the
challenged evidence was admissible to explore the relationship between the
codefendants. Br. of Appellee, 24.
However, as in Ferguson, the State points to no place in the record where the
District Court performed the final step in the Rule 404(b) analysis. The District Court did
not consider whether, under Rule 403 or factors like those identified in Shickles, the
probative value of the challenged evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to
Defendant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although the State is correct that the District Court "need not identify each of the
Shickles factors in its analysis," State v. Barter, 2007 UT App 5, \ 30, 155 P.3d 116, the
fact remains that the District Court did not identify any of the Shickles factors, or any
other factors like those identified in Shickles, in deciding that the challenged evidence
was admissible under Rule 404(b). See Br. of Appellee, 25.
Thus, the District Court failed to conduct a scrupulous examination of the
challenged evidence in this case. This Court should not bail the District Court out by
inferring a scrupulous examination from the record.
III.

THE CHALLENGED EVIDENCE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER
RULE 404(B).
The State next argues that even if the District Court failed to conduct a scrupulous

examination of the challenged evidence under Rule 404(b), such error was harmless
because the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b).

The State analyzes the

admissibility of the challenged evidence under the three prongs of the scrupulous
examination standard. The State argues that 1) the evidence was offered for a proper,
non-character purpose, 2) the evidence was relevant, and 3) the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Although High already addressed each of these prongs in his original brief, he will
address new arguments raised by the State on each of these prongs below.
a.

The non-character purposes proffered by the State are not supported by case
law.
The State first argues that the challenged evidence was offered for a proper, non-

character purpose.

Br. of Appellee, 33-37.

The State proffers the following non-
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character purposes for the challenged evidence: 1) to show that High acted in concert
with two or more persons; 2) to rebut High's claim of self-defense by explaining High's
possible motives for assaulting the Maciels; and 3) to explain the circumstances of the
fight. However, the cases cited by the State do not support its argument that these are
proper non-character purposes.
The first non-character purpose proffered by the State is that the challenged
evidence was offered to show that Defendant acted in concert with two or more persons.
Br. of Appellee, 35.

In support of this argument, the State cites United States v.

Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997).
Westbrook does not support the State's argument because Westbrook admitted
evidence of gang affiliation only. In fact, even though it admitted evidence of gang
affiliation, Westbrook held that evidence similar to the challenged evidence in this case
was inadmissible because it was irrelevant.
The defendant in Westbrook was convicted at trial of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine base. 125 F.3d at 998. The defendant sought to introduce evidence at trial that
his co-defendant was a member of the Gangster Disciples. Id. at 1006-1007. The
defendant claimed that this evidence was relevant to explain his fear of gang reprisals if
he did not participate in the conspiracy. Id. at 1006-1007.
The trial court allowed the defendant to testify at trial that he knew his codefendant was a member of the Gangster Disciples, and that the Gangster Disciples were
dangerous. Id. at 1008. The defendant testified that the he had seen his co-defendant use
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a Gangster Disciples handshake, and that the co-defendant had a Gangster Disciples
tattoo. Id. at 1008.
However, the trial court refused to admit testimony in the form of general
information about the Gangster Disciples. Id. at 1008. The trial court held that such
information was not relevant to the issues or elements before the court. Id. at 1008. The
7 Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence as irrelevant. Id. at
1008.
Thus, Westbrook supports the Defendant's position in this case, not the State's.
As he pointed out at the beginning of this brief, High does not challenge evidence of his
affiliation with PVL. He concedes that such evidence was relevant to show that he acted
in concert with two or more persons. He only challenges information regarding PVL
itself, its purposes, its violent activities, and High's involvement in those activities.
Westbrook held that such evidence was not admissible.
The second non-character purpose offered by the State is that the challenged
evidence was offered to rebut High's self-defense justification at trial by demonstrating
that High had a gang-related motive for fighting with the Maciels. Br. of Appellee, 3536. The State argues that "[hjaving a gang related motive to fight makes it less likely that
[High] merely responded to the aggression of others, and more likely that he initiated the
fight." Br. of Appellee, 36.
However, this argument fails because the Maciels were not gang members. High
testified that the objective of PVL was to fight rival gangs in order to protect its territory.
R. 234:306-309. Since the Maciels were not rival gang members, it follows that High did
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not have a gang-related motive for initiating a fight with them. Thus, all that is left of the
State's alleged "gang-related motive" is an inference that High initiated a fight with the
Maciels because he had a propensity for violence. Propensity is not a proper noncharacter purpose under Rule 404(b).
In support of its "motive" argument, the State cites two cases, Millan v. State, 932
So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. App. 2006), and Utz v. Virginia, 505 S.E.2d 380 (Va. App. 1998),
for the proposition that evidence of gang affiliation is admissible to rebut a self-defense
claim. Br. of Appellee, 36.
The State misses the mark in citing Millan because, as in Westbrook, Millan
admitted evidence of gang affiliation only and did not admit evidence of unrelated gang
activity. The evidence held to be admissible by the Florida appeals court in Millan to
rebut the defendant's self-defense claim was evidence of a symbol of a gang, the Latin
Kings, carved into the forehead of a murder victim by the defendant. 932 So. 2d at 558.
While evidence of unrelated criminal conduct by the Latin Kings had also been
admitted at trial, the Millan court refused to address the admissibility of that evidence on
appeal because the defendant had not objected to its admissibility below. Id. at 558.
Furthermore, the Millan court held that evidence that a cooperating witness had been
beaten by members of the Latin Kings on unrelated occasions was inadmissible, although
the court held its admission was harmless, given that the defendant admitted to killing the
victim and the victim was unarmed. Id. at 560.
Thus, as with other cases cited by the State, Millan does not support the State's
position because admitted evidence of gang affiliation, and excluded evidence of
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unrelated gang activity.

In this appeal, High only challenges evidence of PVL's

unrelated illegal activity and his personal involvement in that activity. Such evidence
would have been excluded under Millan.
High concedes that the other case cited by the State in support of its "motive"
argument, Utz v. Virginia, 505 S.E.2d 380 (Va. App. 1998), is applicable to this case. Br.
of Appellee, 36. In Utz, the defendant claimed at his murder trial that he killed the victim
in self-defense. Id. at 415. The trial court admitted evidence that the defendant and the
victim were members of rival gangs, and also admitted expert testimony regarding the
characteristics and culture of those gangs. Id. at 414. The admission of this evidence
was upheld by the Court of Appeals of Virginia because it established a motive for the
killing and thus rebutted the defendant's claim of self-defense. Id.
However, even though Utz is applicable, it is not persuasive in this case. Utz
relied on ten cases from different jurisdictions that held that gang evidence was relevant
to establish motive. 505 S.E.2d at 422 n. 2. In eight of those cases, as in Utz, the
defendants and the victims were members of rival gangs. High concedes that where the
defendant and the victim are members of rival gangs, gang evidence is relevant to
establishing motive. In such cases, the defendant and the victim have an identifiable
relationship, and the defendant has a demonstrable reason for doing harm to the victim.
However, by contrast, in cases such as the present case in which the defendant is a
member of a gang and the victim is not, the only "motive" supplied by evidence of
unrelated gang activity is defendant's propensity to do violence to anyone by virtue of the
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defendant's other bad acts. The establishment of such a "motive" is an inference which is
impermissible under Rule 404(b).
The other two cases relied on by Utz are similarly unpersuasive. In one of those
cases, People v. Knox, 608 N.E.2d 659 (111. App. 1993), the victims were not identified as
members of a rival gang. Instead, the victims were drug dealers who sought to sell
marijuana to the gang of which the defendant was a member, called the "Royal Family."
Id. at 660-661. The objectives of the Royal Family were to deal drugs and to rob other
drug dealers. M a t 663.
The Knox defendant was convicted of murder for shooting the victims during an
attempt to rob the victims of their drugs. Id. at 663. Evidence of the defendant's
affiliation with the royal family was held to be relevant because it showed defendant's
motive for the killings, i.e., that defendant killed the victims in order to advance the gangrelated goals of dealing drugs and robbing other drug dealers. Id.
The reasoning of Knox does not apply to this case, however, because the stated
goals of PVL were to fight over territory with rival gangs. As pointed out before, the
victims in this case, the Maciels, were not members of a rival gang. Thus, the challenged
evidence was not relevant to motive because it did not show that High initiated a fight
with the Maciels to advance PVL's goal of fighting over territory with rival gangs.
The last case relied on by Utz, State v. Taylor, 687 A.2d 489 (Conn. 1996),
followed the same theme as cases relied on elsewhere by the State. Taylor only admitted
evidence of the defendant's gang affiliation, and did not admit evidence of the
defendant's unrelated illegal activity as a member of the gang. 687 A.2d at 500-501.
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Thus, although Utz appears on its face to be applicable to this case because it
admitted evidence of gang activity beyond the defendant's mere affiliation with a gang,
the reasoning of Utz does not apply to this case, and this Court should not apply Utz. The
State's argument that the challenged evidence was admissible to prove High's motive and
rebut High's claim of self-defense is without merit.
The third non-character purpose proffered by the State is that the challenged
evidence was offered to explain the circumstances of the fight. The State argues that
because of the circumstances of the fight, which included High and others shouting
"PVL" and flashing gang signs, "the jury was entitled to know who and what PVL is."
Br. of Appellee, 36.
As it does elsewhere in its brief, the State provides no analysis of the cases it cites
in support of this argument, and for good reason, because each of these cases contains a
common element that is not present in this case. In each case, the challenged evidence
that was held to be relevant to explain the circumstances of a crime that was closely
related in time to the challenged evidence. In this case, the challenged evidence did not
have this element.
The first case cited, State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985, held that evidence of
strange nicknames, chants, and dances used by the defendant and his friends before and
after an alleged rape were relevant under Utah R. Evid. 402. This evidence was closely
related in time and place to the alleged rape, and could rightly be said to have "provided
background for the charged crime." 2001 UT 30 at f 24. However, the challenged
evidence in this case is not related closely in time or place to the alleged assault on the
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Maciels, and cannot be said to provide background for the fight. Thus, Boyd is not
applicable to this case.
The second case cited, State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989) held that
evidence of a phone conversation in which the defendant implied that he would shoot
police officers was admissible to prove the defendant's intent to kill a police officer he
did shoot on the very same evening. Id. at 1141-1142. However, as in Boyd, this
evidence was closely related in time to the crime charged, and unquestionably pertained
to a "circumstance[] surrounding the instant crime." See Br. of Appellee, 37. In this
case, however, the challenged evidence deals with High's illegal conduct which was not
closely related in time to the alleged assault, nor was it related to the alleged victims.
Thus, Johnson does not support the State's argument.
Finally, in the last case cited by the State, State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880 (Utah
1978), the defendant testified at his trial on a charge of vehicle theft that he stole a
Corvette in Utah so that he could get home to California, and that he siphoned gas during
the trip. 584 P.2d at 881-882. The Utah Supreme Court held that the evidence that the
defendant siphoned gas was admissible to explain the circumstances surrounding the
crime charged. Id. at 882. Again, the evidence at issue in Daniels was closely related in
time to the charged crime, where the challenged evidence in the present case was not.
Thus, the non-character purposes proffered by the State are not supported by the
case law the State cites. This Court should find that the challenged evidence in this case
was not offered for a proper, non-character purpose, but was instead introduced to show
High's violent propensity.
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b.

Defendant does not concede that the challenged evidence was relevant
The State next argues that the challenged evidence was relevant under Rule 402.

Br. of Appellee, 38. However, the State argues that analysis of the challenged evidence
under Rule 402 is not necessary because "[High] himself concedes that the evidence was
relevant." Br. of Appellee, 34, 38. As it does elsewhere, the State here seeks to lump the
challenged evidence in with evidence of High's admitted membership in PVL.
High concedes that evidence of his mere affiliation with PVL was relevant. See
Br. of Appellant, 19. He has never challenged that point. However, contrary to the
State's assertion, High does not now concede, and never has conceded, that the
challenged evidence which went well beyond his mere affiliation was relevant.
c.

Like the District Court the State fails to analyze the probative value and the
prejudicial of the challenged evidence, as required by the scrupulous
examination standard.
The State finally argues that the probative value of the challenged evidence was

not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that the challenged
evidence presented. High's argument on this point was presented in his brief, and will
not be repeated here.
At any rate, there is nothing to respond to because the State does not apply Rule
403 or the factors articulated in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). Instead, the
State assumes the initial point by asserting that "Defendant's argument that the trial court
failed to adequately consider the Shickles factors underscores the fact that the evidence
here was not other bad acts evidence in the first place." High has already addressed this
argument elsewhere.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
High asks this Court to reverse the District Court's overruling of his objection to
evidence of PVL's violent character and activities, and High's personal involvement in
this activities, and remand to the District Court for a new trial.
UPDATED this j2S_ day of December, 2011.
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